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I’d like to thank Professor Shafer for the historical background and addi-
tional perspective he has provided. I have only a few comments in response. I
will proceed from less to more substantive issues.
1. Use of the word ‘‘plausibility’’
Professor Shafer writes,
When participants in a debate appropriate the other sides terms of dis-
course in a way that contradicts the dictionary, the coherence and civility
of the debate is imperiled.
I have to admit to being mystiﬁed as to what contradiction Shafer sees
between his dictionary deﬁnition of ‘‘plausibility,’’ and my use of that term, as
I can ﬁnd none. More to the point, the charge of appropriating terminology
could with more justice be leveled against the theory of belief functions, as
Jaynes use of ‘‘plausibility’’ in the context of Coxs Theorem goes back at least
as far as 1958 [1], which predates Dempsters seminal work on belief functions
[2] by 10 years, and Shafers work [3,4] by 15 years.
From a pragmatic standpoint, though, I concur that it would be worthwhile
to avoid using the term ‘‘plausibility’’ in future discussions of Coxs Theorem,
due to that terms prominence in the theory of belief functions. The suggested
replacement, ‘‘likeliness,’’ is too closely tied to the notion of probability: my
dictionary explicitly deﬁnes it as the probability of an outcome. Looking for
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alternatives, I found the term ‘‘credible’’ deﬁned as ‘‘capable of being credited
or believed; worthy of belief,’’ and credibility deﬁned as ‘‘the quality, capa-
bility, or power to elicit belief.’’ Even here we run into a possible conﬂict with
the use of ‘‘credibility’’ by Smets [5]; however, his usage is also in the context of
deriving a system for uncertain reasoning from axioms. As that is compatible
with the goals of this work, I shall use the term ‘‘credibility’’ in place of
‘‘plausibility’’ in the rest of this note.
2. Bernstein’s work
Bernsteins approach to deriving the rules of probability theory is an in-
teresting alternative to Coxs approach. It appears that Bernsteins axioms
suﬃce to give us the product rule for all domains and propositions, assuming
that the axioms include some analog of Coxs implicit universality axiom. The
sum rule pðA j X Þ þ pð:A j X Þ ¼ 1 appears problematic, however: it depends
on writing A as
Wm
i¼1 Bi, where the Bi are n equally likely, mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive propositions, and observing that pðA j X Þ ¼ m=n whereas
pð:A j X Þ ¼ ðn mÞ=n. It is not clear from Shafers description that Bernsteins
axioms force the sum rule to also hold true for arbitrary propositions A that
may not be expressible in this form. This full generality is achieved, however, if
we add two Cox axioms: universality and the requirement that the credibility of
:A be a continuous function of the credibility of A.
Interesting and revealing though Bernsteins work may be, it is ultimately
irrelevant to judging the appropriateness of Coxs axioms. These must be judged
on their own merits, and not by conformance to a preferred approach for de-
riving probability theory. (After all, the point of the exercise is not to derive
probability theory speciﬁcally, but a logic of uncertain reasoning.) In particular,
Shafer criticizes Cox for not following Bernstein in using the concept of equally
likely cases, and opines that this makes Coxs reasoning unpersuasive. Yet
Shafer believes that ‘‘the concept of equally likely cases provides one way of
seeing’’ why the probability calculus is ‘‘a special, not universal, framework for
uncertain reasoning.’’ If so, why criticize an eﬀort to construct a universal
framework for uncertain reasoning for failing to employ this concept?
3. The value of simplicity
As Shafer notes, I do not claim that the modiﬁed Cox axioms I present are
completely compelling; however, they seem to be the simplest requirements one
could impose while still maintaining compatibility with the propositional cal-
culus and commonsense reasoning. The propositional calculus is compositional:
the truth value of a compound proposition is a function only of the truth values
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of its component sub-propositions and the logical operator applied. This
property gives us a simple recursive procedure for evaluating the truth value of a
compound expression, that terminates when we have decomposed the problem
down to primitive propositions. In generalizing the propositional calculus to
deal with uncertainty, this compositionality is a desirable property to retain.
Consider R3: ð:A j X Þ ¼ SðA j X Þ for some nonincreasing function S. This is
a direct analog of the rule for negation in the propositional calculus, and the
simplest choice we could make. It is such a natural choice, in fact, that both
possibility theory and D–S belief-function theory arguably satisfy R3!
In possibility theory [6] one may view the credibility of a proposition A as
having two coordinates: the possibility of A and necessity of A. In symbols,
ðA j X Þ ¼ ðPX ðAÞ;NX ðAÞÞ;
where NX ðAÞ ¼ 1PX ð:AÞ. Then ð:A j X Þ ¼ SðA j X Þ, where Sðx; yÞ ¼ ð1 y;
1 xÞ. The natural ordering for these credibilities is a partial order, with
credibility increasing whenever possibility or necessity increases without a
decrease in the other; that is, ðx; yÞ6 ðx0; y0Þ iﬀ x6 x0 and y6 y0. Under this
ordering S is a strictly decreasing function.
In D–S belief-function theory [4] the credibility of a proposition A again may
be viewed as having two coordinates: the degree of belief in A and the degree of
doubt in A. In symbols,
ðA j X Þ ¼ ðBelX ðAÞ;DouX ðAÞÞ;
where DouX ðAÞ ¼ BelX ð:AÞ. Then ð:A j X Þ ¼ SðA j X Þ, where Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðy; xÞ.
The natural ordering for these credibilities is a partial order, with credibility
increasing when belief increases without doubt increasing, or when doubt de-
creases without belief decreasing; that is, ðx; yÞ6 ðx0; y0Þ iﬀ x6 x0 and yP y 0.
Under this ordering S is again a strictly decreasing function.
Likewise, we would like to have ðA ^ B j X Þ ¼ F ððA j X Þ; ðB j X ÞÞ, in direct
analogy to the propositional calculus and as the simplest choice we could
make; but this choice is too simple, having unacceptable consequences, as I
have already discussed. The simplest choice that retains some form of com-
positionality is ðA ^ B j X Þ ¼ F ððA j B;X Þ; ðB j X ÞÞ for some function F . Shafer
asks why we should always use the same function F ; my answer is that this is
the simplest approach. Furthermore, it is closest in spirit to the propositional
calculus, in which we always use the same function to combine the truth values
of A and B in evaluating the truth of the conjunction A ^ B.
4. Conclusion
Although there is not a completely compelling case for Coxs axioms, and
thus one cannot claim that probability theory is the only workable logic of
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uncertain reasoning, there are strong grounds for a weaker, but still interesting,
claim: probability theory is the simplest workable logic of uncertain reasoning
one could hope to construct. I suspect that Professor Shafer might be willing to
agree with me on this point, although he would argue that its simplicity limits
its generality, while I would question the need for the added complexity of
belief-function theories. Ultimately, this matter can only be settled by extended
experience applying these theories to real problems, and so I do not expect to
see a resolution for many decades.
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